By Crispin Hull

The Constitution and the relatively small size of the Australian House of Representatives probably condemn us to often having a partisan Speaker.

That, in turn, results in a more unruly and unseemly House, particularly at Question Time. 

The Constitution provides that the House’s first business shall be to “choose a member to be Speaker of the House”. It does not say exactly how that “choosing” will take place, so it has been up to the House itself, through Standing Orders, to do that. At present it is by secret ballot if the position is contested.

But the House (in effect the Government) could change that at any time. So, ultimately, the Government determines who will be Speaker, not the House itself.
In the light of the Bronwyn Bishop saga, a lot of attention has been put upon how the Speaker is chosen.

However, an equally important question is how the Speaker can be removed. The Constitution says the Speaker “can be removed from office by a vote of the House”. This is unfortunate. It means the House on a simple majority vote can remove the Speaker. In short the Speaker only remains in place for as long as the Government wants the Speaker to remain in place.

It hardly makes for a fearlessly impartial Speaker.

For example, in 1975 when Speaker Jim Cope (elected when Labor was in office) dared to “name” government minister Clyde Cameron for disrespect to the Chair (normally resulting in a suspension), the Government refused to support Cope’s action. Cope’s position was untenable and he resigned.

After the Bronwyn Bishop saga, one would have thought it desirable to make it easier to get rid of a Speaker, but paradoxically not. If it were more difficult to get rid of a Speaker (say by a two-thirds vote of the House), the Speaker would be more likely to hold government members to account. As it is, the Cope experience tells all Speakers that trying to discipline government members could result in the loss of their job – merely for actually doing their job.

Standing Orders could be changed to insist on a two-thirds majority, but it would only take a simple majority to change them back again, in effect meaning the Speaker’s position would remain at the mercy of the Government. Only a constitutional amendment could change that – and that ain’t gonna happen.

In countries with larger Parliaments, like Britain with 650 members, Speakers can be fully independent because they can resign from their parties upon election. In Britain, tradition has it that no-one else contests the Speaker’s seat, guaranteeing re-election and continuing in office even if the government changes.

However, in Australia elections are often very tight and every seat counts, so no political party will surrender one of its numbers to an impartial speakership.
In practice, this means that if we are to have good Speakers, governments have to be less partisan and a bit more careful about who they select as Speaker.

The Bishop saga has at least brought about one change: the leader will no longer engage in a captain’s pick for the plum job. Nonetheless, the Liberal Party still appears determined to select a single nominee and the Opposition will get no say. It will be an appointment by the Government, not by the House.

How much better it would be if the party rooms backed off and allowed a genuine vote in the House with anyone being allowed to stand and a succession of ballots held until someone had more than 50 percent.

That would change the dynamic. Someone who had a bit of respect from both sides would be more likely to be elected. An Opposition, for example, might forgo putting up a candidate in the sure knowledge that it would in effect decide which of the government members on offer would be successful.

Another possibility could be a requirement that any candidate be nominated by, say, three or four members from each side. Again, that would ensure a choice who had wider respect and would deny a “captain’s pick” based on extraneous considerations.

But Australian politics has become so partisan that any slight sacrifice in the broader interest of a better functioning democracy will never override the major political parties’ pursuit of having more of its own in positions of power and the attendant staff and resourcing that goes with them.